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THE EVOLUTION OF IRELAND'S KERRY GROUP/PLC—IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE U.S. AND GLOBAL DAIRY-FOOD INDUSTRIES
Jeffrey Wagner, Yane Chandera and W.D. Dobson*
Executive Summary
Introduction
·  Headquartered in Tralee, County Kerry Ireland, the Kerry Group/PLC (Public Limited
Company) is a diversified food ingredients and consumer foods company with 1998 sales
of U.S.$2.6 billion.
·  The firm grew from a small dairy cooperative in the early 1970s to a multinational firm that
has operations in Ireland, the UK, the U.S.,  continental Europe, Canada, Mexico, Brazil,
Argentina, Chile, New Zealand, Australia, and Malaysia.
·  As the firm evolved into a world leader in food ingredients, the sales of Irish-based dairy
products declined to about 11% of the firm's overall revenues.
·  This Discussion Paper describes how the firm developed core strategies, adjusted
effectively to the economic and policy environment that surfaced in the 1970s and 1980s,
and found innovative ways to finance growth. The paper also analyzes Kerry's strategies
and discusses implications of the firm's strategies for U.S.  and other dairy-food exporters
and investors.
Core and Supporting Strategies of the Kerry Group/PLC
·  The Kerry Group/PLC's core strategy is to diversify and grow the business emphasizing
differentiated (value-added) food ingredients and consumer food products.
·  Kerry's implementation of this overall strategy has produced a strong emphasis on food
ingredients as noted in the firm's divisional sales figures for 1998: Kerry Ingredients (63%
of 1998 sales), Kerry Foods (34% of 1998 sales), and Kerry Agribusiness (3% of 1998
sales).
Origins of the Kerry Group/PLC
·  The roots of the Kerry Group/PLC date back to a private company formed in 1972.
·  Kerry Cooperative Creameries Ltd. began its legal existence in January 1974.
·  A brucellosis eradication program reduced Kerry Cooperative's milk supply by about 20%
in the early 1970s.  This caused the Kerry Cooperative's management and board of
directors to realize that if the firm was to grow it needed to reduce the reliance on
commodity dairy products and diversify into differentiated (value-added) products.
·  Kerry Cooperative's diversification program began in 1979-80 when the cooperative
bought 19 Irish firms that sold branded food products.
Financing Strategies of the Kerry Group/PLC
·  In June 1986, Kerry Cooperative exchanged its assets for majority shareholding in a PLC,
mainly to obtain capital for growth.
                                                
* Jeffrey Wagner is an MBA in Agribusiness student and Project Assistant at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison (UW-Madison).  Yane Chandera is a  former MBA in Agribusiness student and
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Economics, Co-Director of the Babcock Institute, and Director of the Renk Agribusiness Institute at
the UW-Madison.  This Discussion Paper is a joint product of the Babcock Institute and Renk
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·  In October 1986, shares of the Kerry Group/PLC were offered to the public and
subsequently listed on the Dublin and London stock exchanges.
·  Kerry Group/PLC's shares initially traded for about 52 Irish pence (about U.S.$0.70 per
share) when the firm's shares were first issued in 1986.  In 1999, the shares traded mostly
in the U.S.$11.00 to U.S.$12.50 range.  The Price/Earnings ratios for Kerry Group stock
in 1999 were approximately twice those for Irish dairy cooperative/PLCs, Golden Vale and
Glanbia.
·  In 1996, Kerry Cooperative reduced its holdings in Kerry Group/PLC below the 51%
level.  This action allowed the Kerry Group/PLC to float additional shares to obtain needed
funds for expansion capital and increase the liquidity of trading in the Kerry Group's
shares.
·  Kerry Cooperative and Kerry Group/PLC have effectively handled the conflicts between
farmers and non-farmer shareholders that sometimes arise when an agricultural cooperative
converts to a PLC.
Kerry Group/PLC's Acquisitions
·  The financing capacity gained by Kerry, in part by the move to cooperative/PLC status,
allowed the firm to accelerate its overseas acquisitions.
·  Kerry Group/PLC opened its first overseas food ingredients plant in Jackson, Wisconsin in
1987 and in 1988 acquired Beatreme Food Ingredients, another U.S. firm.
·  Kerry Group/PLC acquired DCA in 1994 from Allied Domecq for U.S.$402 million.
·  By 1995, Kerry Group/PLC had made about 43 acquisitions, which had caused the firm to
double in size in each of the previous five-year periods.
·  Most of Kerry's recent acquisitions have been for food ingredients firms, which typically
generate high profit margins.  The corporation's capital investments have provided the
infrastructure (e.g., technology, R&D and distribution systems) needed by the rapidly
growing firm.
·  In 1998, 26% of the firm's sales and 38% of the firm's operating profits were obtained
from the Americas.
·  While Kerry's early acquisitions were made in part with capital raised in the share market,
the bulk of the Kerry Group/PLC's acquisitions—especially those made before Kerry
Cooperative relinquished majority control in 1996—were made with debt.
Strategies and Practices that Underpin the Kerry Group/PLC's Financing,
Expansion, and Diversification Initiatives
·         Knowledge           is           the          forerunner            of          strategy       .   Mr. Denis Brosnan,  the Kerry Group/PLC's
long-time Managing Director, contends that to make sound strategic decisions the firm must
know which sector it is in or wants to be in, the strengths and weaknesses of competitors,
the nature of the marketplace, how consumer demands are changing and, for an
international business, which decisions can be made locally and which must be reserved for
the corporate office.
·       R&D          expenditures             must           increase     .   According to Brosnan, the food ingredients sector is
somewhere between food engineering and pharmaceutical application; 2.5% to 3.0% of the
Kerry Group's turnover will continue to be spent on R&D because of its importance.
·       Personnel          and             marketing            practices             must          evolve     .  Practices relating to these two functions
changed markedly as Kerry evolved from a dairy cooperative into a food ingredients and
consumer foods company.  Kerry stopped exporting through the Irish Dairy Board in about
1990.The Evolution of Ireland’s Kerry Group/PLC￿Implications for the U.S. and Global Dairy-Food Industries
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An Analysis of Kerry Group/PLC's Corporate Strategies
·  The Collis-Montgomery "Triangle of Corporate Strategy" was used to evaluate Kerry's
corporate strategies.
·  The firm appears to have a well-articulated vision, internally consistent strategies, strategies
that fit well with the external environment, and good risk management capabilities.
·  It is unclear whether the firm's value creation processes—achieved in part by frequent
acquisitions of high profit margin food ingredient companies—will be sustainable over the
long-term.
·  Kerry acquisitions have been, by most accounts, remarkably successful.  However, merger
and acquisition studies suggest that most firms should not expect to earn economic rents on
assets purchased in the market.  The Kerry Group/PLC may confront this reality in future
acquisitions.
Implications of Kerry Group/PLC's Strategies for U.S. and other Dairy-Food
Exporters and Investors
·  Certain ideas flow from Kerry's strategies that have implications for U.S.  and other dairy-
food exporters and investors.
·  Ability to relate a company to its environment is important.
·  Continuity in top management is important.
·  Knowledge is a key forerunner to strategy.
·  Early mover advantages are important.
·  Latin America and Asia are growth markets for dairy and other food products.
·  A firm's infrastructure must change substantially when it evolves as much as Kerry
Group/PLC.
·  Kerry Cooperative's conversion to a cooperative/PLC was a necessary but not sufficient
condition for success.
·  Acquisitions possess inherent drawbacks.
·  The Kerry Group/PLC model will not be easily replicated.The Evolution of Ireland’s Kerry Group/PLC￿Implications for the U.S. and Global Dairy-Food Industries
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THE EVOLUTION OF IRELAND'S KERRY GROUP/PLC—IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE U.S. AND GLOBAL DAIRY-FOOD INDUSTRIES
Jeffrey Wagner, Yane Chandera and W.D. Dobson
Introduction
Headquartered in Tralee, County Kerry Ireland, the Kerry Group/PLC (public limited
company) is a diversified food ingredients and consumer foods company, which had sales of
U.S.$2.6 billion and 12,378 employees in 1998 [13,31]. The firm has operations in Ireland, the
UK, the U.S., continental Europe, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, New Zealand, Australia, and Malaysia
[31].  It produces and markets specialty food ingredients, food coatings, bakery mixes, fruit
preparations, flavorings, and proteins and manufactures consumer food products in the dairy,
beef, pork, poultry, savory and convenience product sectors.
The firm's  sales and net income for 1998 and the average yearly increases in these two




1994-98 Growth Rate 14.51% 20.93%
Kerry Group/PLC's three main divisions and the percentage of the firm's revenues generated
by each division in 1998 are noted below [9]:




Food Ingredients produced by Kerry Group/PLC include cheese powders, mozzarella cheese
products for restaurant chains, doughnut mixes, other batter mixes, bread crumbs, specialty
proteins for nutritional diets, flavorings for snack foods, and clouding agents.  In recent years, the
firm has acquired a substantial presence in the particulates technology business—e.g., small pieces
of fruit, nuts, cheese, and chocolate that are used in processed foods such as breakfast cereals,
nutritional bars, and premium ice creams.
Kerry Foods brands (which are well known in Ireland, the UK, and other parts of Europe)
include Wall's, Mattesson's, Richmond, Denny, Lawson's, Miller's, Golden Bridge, Homepride,
Ballyfree, Kerrymaid, Low Low, Dawn (fluid milk and juices), and Kerry Spring (water).  The
Kerry Group's Foods Division also does private label work for other firms.
Kerry Agribusiness sells animal feeds and fertilizers, operates creameries, and provides
livestock artificial insemination services, trucking services, and on-farm technical services.
Kerry Group/PLC traces its beginnings to 1972 when it began operations as a relatively small
private firm that evolved into a small dairy cooperative in 1974.
Kerry Group/PLC is frequently described by analysts as a successful  international food
ingredients and consumer food products firm that grew rapidly—mainly by acquiring other
companies—during the late 1980s and 1990s.  Information on how the Kerry Group/PLC arrived
at its present position should be useful to U.S.  and other firms with interests in exporting and
foreign direct investment in global dairy-food businesses.  In particular, it should be useful forThe Evolution of Ireland’s Kerry Group/PLC￿Implications for the U.S. and Global Dairy-Food Industries
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dairy-food exporters and investors to see how the firm developed core, consistent strategies,
adjusted effectively to changes in the economic and policy environment that surfaced in the 1970s
and 1980s,  and found innovative ways to finance growth of the business. These points are
considered in the paper, together with an analysis of Kerry's strategies and a discussion of
implications of the firm's strategies for dairy-food exporters and investors in the U.S.  and other
countries.
I. Core and Supporting Strategies of the Kerry Group/PLC
The Kerry Group/PLC's core strategy is to diversify and grow the business emphasizing
differentiated (value-added) food ingredients and consumer food products [2].  This core strategy
has been supported and complemented by the other strategies and practices that:
·  Converted the business from a dairy cooperative to a cooperative/PLC to raise expansion
capital.
·  Facilitated growth of the firm both by acquisitions (mostly outside of Ireland) and
expanding existing businesses.
·  Involved large Research and Development (R&D) expenditures to support expansion of the
food ingredients business and consumer food product businesses.
·  Implemented personnel policies and marketing practices that  supported the firm's growth
and diversification strategies.
II. Origins of the Kerry Group/PLC
Michael Porter of Harvard's Business School contends that "The essence of formulating
competitive strategy is relating a company to its environment" [28, p. 3].  The Kerry Group/PLC
developed strategies that dealt effectively with the economic and policy environment facing the firm
in the 1970s and 1980s.  It is useful to briefly examine the firm's early history to see the milieu
from which the firm's strategies emerged.
The Private Company
The roots of the Kerry Group/PLC date back to a private company formed in 1972.  The
private company in question was created when three shareholders—(a) the state-owned Dairy
Disposal Company, (b) a federation of eight small farmer cooperatives in County Kerry Ireland,
and (c) the Erie Casein Company in the U.S.—invested 150,000 Irish pounds to finance a casein
plant that would manufacture casein for export to the U.S.  Ownership of the casein manufacturing
firm, known as North Kerry Milk Products Ltd. (NKMP), was split as follows [12]:
·  Dairy Disposal Company 42.5%
·  Federation of eight farmer cooperatives 42.5%
·  Erie Casein Company 15.0%
Formation of Kerry Cooperative
When Ireland joined the then European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, many small
dairy firms and cooperatives merged to compete with the larger milk companies in the EEC.  Kerry
Cooperative Creameries Ltd. was formed when milk producers in County Kerry contributed capital
to acquire the state-owned Dairy Disposal Company and its 42.5% stake in the private NKMP.  In
addition, six of the eight independent farmer cooperatives (part owners of the other 42.5% of
NKMP) merged and the private company created became a subsidiary of the newly formed Kerry
Cooperative Creameries Ltd.  Kerry Cooperative Creameries Ltd. began its legal existence inThe Evolution of Ireland’s Kerry Group/PLC￿Implications for the U.S. and Global Dairy-Food Industries
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January 1774.  The smallest of Ireland's six major agricultural cooperatives, the Kerry
Cooperative, had sales of 23 million Irish pounds (about U.S.$50 million) in 1974.
Growth through Dairy Processing, 1974-78
During 1974-80, Kerry Cooperative Creameries Ltd. acquired or merged with the Killarney,
Limerick, and Ballinahina Dairies and witnessed an increase in its milk supply from 67 million to
87 million gallons (+30%). The cooperative recorded satisfactory profits through its milk
processing activities.  But in 1979-80, as a result of an unusually wet summer and the workings of
a brucellosis eradication scheme, the cooperative lost 20% of its milk supply.  In 1986, Mr. Denis
Brosnan, Managing Director of Kerry Group/PLC or its predecessor firms from 1972 to the
present, described the impact of the brucellosis eradication program, which led to the slaughter of
thousands of dairy cattle in Kerry Cooperative's milk supply area, as follows [29]:
It was either going to be a disaster or a blessing. Our cow population was immediately cut
by 20% but we still had the same overheads.  We were forced to reorganize.
It became clear to Kerry Cooperative's management and board of directors that if the
organization was to grow and develop, it needed to reduce its reliance on commodity dairy
products and diversify into more differentiated (value-added) products.  Thus, the firm introduced
the concept of corporate planning and corporate strategy into its management systems and culture
[30].  This, in turn, led the organization to agree to a five-year corporate plan that emphasized
R&D, diversification, and overseas growth.
Kerry Cooperative's management and board of directors began efforts to diversify into value
added products before the EEC adopted milk production quotas in 1984.  Thus, the wisdom of the
firm's  decision to emphasize overseas investment, as well as production and marketing of
differentiated food ingredients and food products, was validated when the EEC decided to impose
milk production-limiting quotas.  In 1995, Brosnan explained Kerry's continued lack of interest in
expanding investment in Ireland's milk business, as follows [19]:
If anybody could point out the advantage of merging with or taking over another Irish
company, then we would do so.  I do not see any advantage, we would simply be buying into
a milk business which is heavily regulated by the EU and which is very cyclical.
Management Takes New Directions, 1979-85
Brosnan reported how the new directions first began to materialize as follows[30]:
We started in 1979-80 to get away from dependence on milk, and began buying
companies in Ireland—19 altogether.  We specifically bought the top brands that were
available, and that put us firmly in the food business.  We got into ingredients when we
decided to follow our casein to the U.S.
Structures were put in place during 1980-85 to help Kerry Cooperative Creameries, Ltd.
become an international food business.  Management recognized that the Kerry Cooperative's milk
protein was being used in sophisticated food products.  It was also apparent to management that
greater value could be generated by supplying specialty food ingredients to the convenience food
industry rather than sell the firm's dairy products as dairy commodities.  Accordingly, Kerry
bought Erie Casein's interest in NKMP, acquiring full ownership in a large food ingredient base in
the U.S.  In 1983, Kerry Cooperative established U.S. and UK headquarters offices in Chicago
and London, respectively.
The Erie Casein acquisition marked the beginning of Kerry Cooperative's major efforts to
serve overseas markets.  The firm secured the funds required to purchase overseas companies
partly from equity capital obtained by converting the organization to a cooperative/PLC in 1986.The Evolution of Ireland’s Kerry Group/PLC￿Implications for the U.S. and Global Dairy-Food Industries
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III.Financing Strategies of the Kerry Group/PLC
While Kerry Group/PLC has used complex debt, equity, and cash financing practices in recent
years, the firm made a pioneering move in equity financing in 1986 that warrants attention.  In
June of 1986, Kerry Cooperative Creameries, Ltd. exchanged its assets for majority shareholding
in a public limited company, mainly to obtain capital for growth.  Other Irish cooperatives (then
Avonmore Foods,  Waterford Foods,  and Golden Vale Cooperative) followed suit shortly
thereafter.
Jacobson and O'Leary described Kerry Cooperative's initial share offering in these terms [7,
p. 131]:
A total of 150 million shares represented the ownership of Kerry Group PLC.  Sixty
million of the shares were identified as A ordinary shares and were owned by individual
investors and other investment groups. The other 90 million shares were owned by Kerry
Cooperative Creameries Ltd.   The 6,000 shareholders in Kerry Cooperative indirectly owned
the 90 million B ordinary shares in Kerry Group PLC.











* Source: Jacobson and O'Leary [7].
Kerry Cooperative, Ltd. owned the ordinary B shares of the newly formed Kerry Group/PLC
(Figure 1).  Rules of the PLC stipulated that the Cooperative was required to retain a controlling
interest (at least 51%) of the new company.  In October 1986, the A shares of Kerry Group/PLC
were offered to the public and subsequently listed on the Dublin and London stock exchanges.
Fifteen of the 20 directors for Kerry Group/PLC were farmer-directors of Kerry Cooperative,
Ltd.  The other five directors were executives of the new PLC firm.
Why Did Kerry Cooperative and Other Irish Agricultural Cooperatives Opt to
Form PLC's?
In the mid-1980s, it was unusual for agricultural cooperatives to become cooperative/PLCs.
Why did Kerry Cooperative and other Irish agricultural cooperatives take this step?
Prior to the mid-1980s, farmer members of Irish agricultural cooperatives said that they
required three things from investments in their organizations [7, p. 52]:
·  Capital growth.
·  Reasonable dividends.
·  Tradability.The Evolution of Ireland’s Kerry Group/PLC￿Implications for the U.S. and Global Dairy-Food Industries
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In Ireland during this period, the PLC mechanism held promise for addressing these matters
while existing cooperative financing models did not.
The failure of the existing cooperative financing models to address these needs has complex
origins.  But, the management and operating practices of Irish agricultural cooperatives exhibited
characteristics during this period that encouraged the formation of PLC's,  including those noted
below:
·  The ownership structure of the cooperatives had a high proportion of inactive shareholders.
In some cooperatives, a substantial number of farmer patrons were not members.
·  Equity redemption polices among dairy cooperatives were almost nonexistent.
·  There were problems with capital and/or share valuation.
The last two items are perhaps the most important.  Prior to the mid-1980s, Irish agricultural
cooperatives had pursued financing practices that discouraged farmers from providing expansion
capital to the organizations. In particular, many Irish agricultural cooperatives retained profits
generated from operations in the form of unallocated reserves.
This contrasts with the U.S.  situation where frequently a large percentage of the profits of an
agricultural cooperative are allocated to individual members on the books of the cooperative and
some minimum amount of profits is paid out to members in cash each year. (U.S. agricultural
cooperatives are legally obligated to pay out at least 20% of net earnings in cash each year.)  The
record of U.S. cooperatives in handling reserves certainly does not satisfy all farmers.  However,
many U.S.  cooperatives operate revolving funds under which profits are (a) revolved back to
members using 8 to 15 year revolving period arrangements, and (b)  revolve back to the farmer
member or his/her heirs the allocated reserves when the farmer leaves the cooperative, retires or
dies.  These practices give value to farmers' claims on the cooperatives allocated reserves.
In the mid-1980s, many Irish agricultural cooperatives had on their books sizeable
accumulations of retained earnings in the form of unallocated reserves.  Farmer members held
shares in the Irish cooperatives, which they felt gave them claims to the cooperatives’ unallocated
reserves and other assets.  But, farmer members correctly perceived that there was little chance that
unallocated reserves would be paid to them.  Thus, their shares had little value but implicitly
represented valuable assets if they could cash them in.
While some farmer members received dividends on allocated reserves, these reserves typically
were such a small percentage of the total reserves of the cooperatives that the payments were
minimal.  Jacobson and O'Leary report, for example, that in 1988 allocated reserves accounted for
an average of only about 7% of the reserves of 15 Irish dairy cooperatives studied [7, p. 32].
The presence of unallocated reserves also made a few cooperatives targets for takeover by
private firms.   Thus, in January 1988, the shareholders of Bailieboro Cooperative Agricultural and
Dairy Society Ltd. voted by more than two to one to accept an offer for their shares from the
Goodman/Food Industries Group, a public limited company [7, pp. 16-17].  These shareholders
had found a way to obtain cash for the potentially valuable shares.  One other cooperative followed
suit.
A number of Irish agricultural cooperatives opted for the PLC model rather than adopt a U.S.-
type system of allocating more reserves to members and dealing with other financing problems
affecting the cooperatives. This choice stemmed partly from the cooperatives' needs to expand the
scale of processing operations.  For several Irish cooperatives, this expansion would have required
more capital than could have been raised even with a U.S. style management and financing system
for the cooperatives. In part this was because many Irish farmers who needed capital to expand or
upgrade their own operations were not in a position to make large capital contributions to the
cooperatives.The Evolution of Ireland’s Kerry Group/PLC￿Implications for the U.S. and Global Dairy-Food Industries
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It was against this backdrop that Kerry Cooperative's initiative to form a cooperative PLC to
raise needed expansion capital received a cordial reception.
Kerry Group/PLC's Stock Prices
Kerry Group/PLC shares traded for  about 52 Irish pence (about U.S.$0.70 per share) when
the firm's shares were first issued in 1986 [12].  Original cooperative shareholders were offered
shares in Kerry Group/PLC at 35 Irish pence (about U.S.$0.47 per share) before the 1986
flotation.  Thus, by early 1996 when the price rose to about U.S.$6.00, the firm's shareholders
had already realized substantial price appreciation (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Kerry Group/PLC's Share Prices, Earnings, and Dividends, 1995-
2000 (U.S.$)*
Kerry Group plc
* Source: Wright Investors' Service [32], the analysis is reported in U.S. dollars.
http://profiles.wisi.com/profiles/scripts/largechart.asp?cusip=C372ER900&curconv=978.
Kerry Group/PLC adopted a rule change in 1996, which permitted the Kerry Cooperative’s
share holdings to drop below 51% of those for the corporation. (The Cooperative’s share of the
Kerry Group's stock cannot decline below 20% without an additional rule change.)  After gaining
the approval of over 75% of Kerry Cooperative's members, Kerry Cooperative transferred a
quarter of its PLC holdings directly to coop shareholders [14]. Prior to this action, Kerry
Cooperative shareholders individually held about 10% of the PLC shares.  The transfer increased
the coop shareholders direct stake in the PLC to about 23%.
This change allowed the firm to float additional shares on the public market, increased the
market liquidity for Kerry's shares making the share more attractive to foreign investors in
particular, and permitted share appreciation for farmers who held shares in the firm. Subsequently,
the Kerry Cooperative's stake in the public company fell to 37% in May 1999 [17].
Coincident with this change, the number of Kerry Cooperative directors on the Group's board
of directors was reduced  from 15 to nine.  The increase in the amount of public ownership of the
firm increased trading in the Kerry Group/PLC's stock and also increased the volatility of the stockThe Evolution of Ireland’s Kerry Group/PLC￿Implications for the U.S. and Global Dairy-Food Industries
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price  (Figure 2).  In 1998 the Kerry Group/PLC's stock traded for several months in the
U.S.$11.00 to U.S.$14.00 range before leveling off to trade in the U.S.$11.00 to U.S.$12.50
range during much of 1999.
The stock of Kerry Group/PLC in 1999 traded at approximately double the P/E ratio of Irish
dairy companies Golden Vale and Glanbia (merged Avonmore/Waterford organization) [17].
Kerry's higher P/E ratios presumably reflect the impact of many developments, including Kerry's
decision to emphasize food ingredients.
Kerry's Handling of Potential Conflicts Between Non-Cooperative Stockholders
and Farmer-Members of Kerry Cooperative
When a farmer cooperative converts to a cooperative/PLC, it sometimes creates conflicts
between farmer-members of the cooperative and non-cooperative shareholders in the PLC.
In part the conflict arises over issues of control.  Kerry appears to have resolved this issue
successfully.  Kerry Cooperative, Inc. still held 37% of the stock of the Kerry Group/PLC and
placed nine members on the board of directors for the Kerry Group after the 1996 action. This
appeared to satisfy farmer-members of the cooperative that they retained appropriate amounts of
control over Kerry Group/PLC.  In addition, in 1996 after Kerry Cooperative's holdings in Kerry
Group were reduced, the Kerry Group/PLC gave Kerry Cooperative the option to buy the Kerry
Group/PLC's Agribusiness Division between the years 2001 and 2020 [26]. The purchase could
be made to ensure that the Agribusiness Division's farm inputs and services would continue to be
available to members of the Cooperative. If the Cooperative elects to buy the Kerry Group's
Agribusiness Division, it likely will finance the purchase with stock held in the Kerry Group/PLC.
Conflicts can also arise between milk suppliers and non-farmer shareholders in a PLC.  For
example, farmer-members supplying milk to a dairy cooperative/PLC often prefer to receive high
milk prices rather than capital appreciation or elevated stock dividends.  Non-farmer shareholders
in the organization, on the other hand, typically prefer management activities that emphasize stock
appreciation and/or large stock dividends.
This potential source of conflict appears not to have been a problem for Kerry. Members of
Kerry Cooperative have benefited both as milk suppliers and stockholders. They have realized
stock appreciation and have received stock dividends and competitive milk prices.  Hugh Friel,
Deputy Managing Director of Kerry/PLC, reported that "milk prices are not an issue" for Kerry
[6].  Presumably this means that Kerry generates enough profit to pay competitive milk prices
through efficient and profitable milk processing and marketing operations.  Moreover, the firm
could, if it chose to do so, cross subsidize milk producers with profits generated by other parts of
the firm.
Particularly before the 1996 action, which reduced Kerry Cooperative's holdings of Kerry
Group/PLC below 51%, non-farmer shareholders sought additional shares in the thinly-traded
Kerry Group stock, presumably because they thought it represented an attractive investment.  The
high P/E ratios enjoyed by Kerry compared to other Irish cooperative/PLC firms in 1999 suggests
that it is still regarded as a relatively attractive investment.
Thus, the firm's successes, the 35%+ shareholdings retained by Kerry Cooperative, and the
agreement to give Kerry Cooperative an option to buy the Group's Agribusiness Division appear to
have eliminated most potential sources of conflict among Kerry Cooperative, the Kerry Group's
farmer shareholders and other shareholder groups.The Evolution of Ireland’s Kerry Group/PLC￿Implications for the U.S. and Global Dairy-Food Industries
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IV. Kerry Group/PLC's Acquisitions and Capital Investments
Acquisitions
The financing capacity gained in part by the move to cooperative/PLC status enabled the Kerry
Group to accelerate the firm's acquisitions—especially overseas.  Kerry Group/PLC opened its
first overseas food ingredients manufacturing plant in Jackson, Wisconsin in 1987 and in 1988
acquired Beatreme Food Ingredients, a division of Beatrice Corporation [12, p. 3].  Kerry officials
described Beatreme Food Ingredients, which was acquired for U.S.$130 million, as the "premier
specialty food ingredient supplier in the U.S. market" [12, p.3].
The Kerry Group in 1993 acquired Malcolm Foods of St. George, Ontario and Research
Foods in Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
The Kerry Group/PLC initially developed its European food ingredients business in the dairy,
confectionery and convenience food sector from the Listowel plant in Ireland and the Wadersloh
Table 1. Partial List of Kerry Group/PLC's Acquisitions, 1995-99*
Year, Company and Country Nature of Acquired Firm
1995
Broadheath, UK Fruit preparations for bakers
Ciprial, France and Italy Candied fruit and fruit ingredients for patisserie
and marron glaces
Solutech DCA, Australia Food ingredients for Australia, Pacific Basin,
and S.E. Asia
1997
Glen Arrow Products, Canada Specialty food ingredients
Ciprial & Margretts, France Merger
G.R. Spinks, UK Fruit ingredients
Johor Bahru Food Ingredients Plant, Malaysia Food ingredients processing
Star & Arty Ingredientes, Alimenticios LTDA,
Brazil
Ingredients for the chilled dairy and bakery
industries, and snack and fast food sectors
1998
SDF Foods, Malaysia Food ingredients for S.E. Asia customers
Dalgety Food Ingredients, Eight European
Countries
Food coatings, ingredients, seasonings, bakery
products, consumer foods
Burns Philip Ingredients, Australia & New
Zealand
Food ingredients
Spinks & Co., Ireland/UK Fruit preparations
1999
Completed acquisition of Tukania Proca Gmbh
in Rodgau, Germany
Snack foods
Shade Food Group, USA and SFI, Europe Flavored particulates, high protein inclusions,
specialty chocolate, and compound coatings
* Source: Sevmour-Cooke, Ltd., "Europe's Top Food Groups, Kerry Group, Tralee, Co. Kerry, Ireland," 1998 and
Kerry Group/PLC Corporate History [12].The Evolution of Ireland’s Kerry Group/PLC￿Implications for the U.S. and Global Dairy-Food Industries
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plant in Germany [12, p. 3].  Later, through the acquisition of Eastleigh Flavors and Tingles Ltd.
in 1993, the Kerry Group became a leading supplier to the UK and Continental Europe snack food
and food processing industries [12, p. 4].
Kerry Group/PLC acquired DCA in 1994 from Allied Domecq, PLC for U.S.$402 million.
The acquisition was financed with loans from three Irish Banks plus a share issue.  At the time of
the acquisition, DCA had operations in five countries with two-thirds of the value residing in the
U.S.  B. McGrath, Markets Editor for      The           Irish            Times     , described the acquisition as follows [15]:
DCA brings the group into cereal based ingredients and the fruit flavor markets and
complements Kerry's existing strengths in dairy-based ingredients.  Like the existing Kerry
business, DCA has operations in five countries and specializes in the manufacture of food
ingredients for the baking, food processing, and food service industries.
This DCA deal made Kerry Group/PLC a world leader in the food ingredients business.
By 1995, Kerry Group/PLC had made about 43 acquisitions, which allowed the firm to double
in size in each of the previous five-year periods [30]. Table 1 shows recent acquisitions together
with the geographic areas and products emphasized.
While the acquisitions in Table 1 do not comprise an exhaustive list, the table does show the
nature of the Kerry Group/PLC's recent acquisitions—many have been in the food ingredients
business.  They also show the firm is establishing the foundation for further expansion into Latin
America and South Asia—growth markets for food businesses.  Kerry reports that the expansion
into Latin America enables the firm to supply fast food businesses that are expanding rapidly in
these growth markets.
Brosnan provided insights on the firm's acquisition strategies in a 1995 interview.  His views
on the Beatreme acquisition, investments in Eastern Europe, and investments in North America are
summarized below [30]:
(Beatreme) In 1983, we began tracking Beatrice Foods Specialties, which eventually
became Beatreme.  We tried to buy it from '83 to '88.  So we were in closest when it was put
up for sale…At the time of purchase, we were about the same size.  Kerry paid U.S.$135
million for Beatreme back in 1988. Many thought it was way too much.  But we had a
different view and followed our judgment.
(Investments in Eastern Europe) In purchasing DCA, we acquired an operation in Poland.
We've looked at Eastern Europe quite a lot.  Our view is that it's going to take longer than
earlier thought for Eastern Europe to advance.  So far, we've decided to stay out, but keep it
under review 'til about the year 2000.  Like everyone else, we looked at Poland, Hungary and
Czechoslovakia when the barriers came down a few years ago, but decided to wait.  There's a
lot of money to be made, but it depends on the time frame.  Although it will cost a bit more
to go in later, we'll wait until we're closer to those countries becoming part of the EU.
(Investments in North America) Kerry has major investments in Mexico and Canada.
We've often said that if we were as wise in 1973 when Ireland joined the EC, we could have
perhaps made a lot more money earlier. Joining the EC gave Ireland a much larger
marketplace.  NAFTA will bring huge opportunities on the North American continent, and
we'll be investing further in all countries.  It's good for North America.
Capital Investments
The firm's capital investments during 1995-1998 appear in Appendix Table 1.  The pattern is
different from that of the acquisitions.  The investments were directed substantially toward building
new warehouses, distribution centers, technical centers, and research centers.  Among other
things,  these expenditures establish the infrastructure to support the functioning of the expanded
firm. Capital expenditures also were made to upgrade, and expand ready meals processing plants,
upgrade and expand meat and poultry processing capacity, and fruit preparation.  Capital
expenditures were distributed geographically across a host of countries including the U.S., France,
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Kerry made capital investments in Poland in 1998 (Appendix Table 1).  The firm invested 2.0
million Irish pounds in fruit preparation facilities at its plant in Kielce, Poland to serve markets in
Central and Eastern Europe [9, p. 13].  Apparently Kerry's management concluded that Poland
was sufficiently promising that it warranted the additional investment despite the firm's reluctance
to expand its presence in Eastern Europe.
Kerry Group/PLC's current configuration of course was not entirely determined by
acquisitions and capital investment.  Divestitures—while not numerous—also have shaped the
company.  Kerry's first acquisition in the U.S.—an imitation cheese company—was later sold
[30].  In 1995, the firm sold its Irish beef processing operations in Rathdowney, Waterford, and
Clones.  In 1996, the DCA headquarters in New York and the Fenton, Missouri offices of the
coatings division were closed and administration transferred to Beloit, Wisconsin. In 1998,
following  the acquisition of Dalgety's food ingredients division, eight Spillers mills and Fleming
Howden were sold to Tompkins, PLC.
Kerry Group/PLC's acquisitions and divestitures contributed to the following pattern of sales
and operating profits in 1998 [9]:
Geographic Area % of Sales % of Operating Profit
Ireland 26.7 18.6
Rest of Europe 43.9 41.6
Americas 26.3 38.5
Rest of the World 3.1 1.3
Total 100.0 100.0
As noted earlier, the Kerry Ingredients division accounted for 63% of the firm's sales in 1998.
The firm's  acquisitions of large firms and—especially ingredients firms—promise to be the
hallmark of Kerry's future acquisitions. Brosnan commented as follows on these points[30]:   
…we  seldom buy small companies any longer.  We're growing internationally in
ingredients, and in Europe we're growing in consumer foods….  I think the percentages (ratio
of food ingredients to consumer foods) will have to change as food ingredients on an
international basis give us more scope than food products in Northern Europe.  But we're
very good at both.
The higher profit margins on ingredients are likely to push the firm to emphasize food
ingredients.  Curran, an analyst who investigated Kerry Group/PLC's operations, reported that
"The food business can yield margins of about 7%,  but when a company invests in the technology
to mass produce ingredients such as cheese powder, or coatings for fried products, margins can
increase to over 12%" [5].  It is not clear whether the spread between the margins on ingredients
and consumer food products is as large as the five percentage point difference mentioned by
Curran.  But it is likely that food ingredients will remain more profitable for Kerry than consumer
food products in the highly competitive European and North American consumer food product
markets.
Kerry's push toward the ingredients business has been accompanied by a sharp reduction in
revenues from Irish milk sales.  After the DCA acquisition in 1994, the dairying business based in
Ireland formed only about 11% of Kerry's total sales [15].
Financing of Recent Acquisitions
While some of the Kerry Group/PLC's early acquisitions were made substantially with equity
funds, McGrath reports that the firm has funded the “vast bulk of its 800 million Irish pounds of
acquisitions of the past 10 years (1988 to 1998) through debt” [22].  McGrath described theThe Evolution of Ireland’s Kerry Group/PLC￿Implications for the U.S. and Global Dairy-Food Industries
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financial impact of Kerry's acquisition of the Dalgety food ingredients business in 1998 as follows
[22]:
When this deal is completed, Kerry will have total debt of around 660 million Irish
pounds on shareholders funds of just 120 million pounds.  This represents a debt/equity level
of over 500%—an astronomical level of debt for a company the size of Kerry….
Increasingly, analysts are ignoring gearing (debt load) when assessing companies after
heavily leveraged acquisitions like Kerry's purchase of the Dalgety food ingredients business.
Interest cover and cash flow generation are used as more accurate gauges of a company's
ability to meet its debt obligations….  Kerry will be able to reduce the 660 million net debt
figure to 590 million pounds by the end of 1998 and reduce it substantially further in
succeeding years.
Why the heavy emphasis on debt use to finance acquisitions?  Part of the reason lies in the
constraint that until 1996 required Kerry Cooperative to maintain a 51% controlling interest in the
PLC.  McGrath notes that Kerry apparently has not had to walk away from any acquisitions
because of money.  However, Brosnan and Friel noted that in the case of the U.S.$402 million
spent on DCA, Kerry would have preferred to use more than 25 million Irish pounds of equity
funding and would have done so if it had not been for the 51% rule [20].
V. Strategies and Practices that Underpin the Kerry Group/PLC's Financing,
Expansion and Diversification Initiatives
The Kerry Group/PLC's financing, expansion, and diversification initiatives during the past 25
years have required major changes in infrastructure and methods of operation.  Those relating to
knowledge generation, personnel practices, R&D, and marketing practices are discussed briefly
below.
Knowledge is the Forerunner of Strategy
Brosnan's comments indicate that the firm's major acquisitions, capital investment decisions,
and divestitures were preceded by substantial analysis. In 1995, he described guidelines that have
shaped the firm's product line and the geographic location of the firm's production and marketing
activities, as follow [3]:
·  Know which sector you are in or want to be in.
·  Know your competitors.
·  Know the marketplace.
·  Know or anticipate the rapidly changing demands of consumers of your product.
·  Know in an international business which decisions can be made by decentralized (local)
management and which decisions must be reserved for the corporate office.
Brosnan summarized the importance of these points, saying that knowledge is the forerunner
of strategy.  How important knowledge is to the firm's strategies is suggested by comments made
by Kerry officials in connection with the Beatreme and DCA acquisitions.
Recall that Kerry had accumulated knowledge about Beatreme (or its predecessor organization)
from about 1983 until the 1988 purchase date. In 1988, some financial analysts argued that Kerry
paid too much for Beatreme.  Kerry rejected this reasoning partly because it had followed
Beatreme's progress for about five years and had thoroughly assessed the value of the firm. As it
turned out, the large profit margins generated by Beatreme helped Kerry manage, and pay down
rapidly, a significant part of the potentially burdensome debt load taken on by Kerry for the DCA
purchase in 1994.
Kerry's  preparations for submitting the bid for DCA provide additional insights about the
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Group/PLC put in four months of work involving up to 40 people in the final stages of the effort,
working on the due diligence and financing arrangements.  This allowed Kerry to develop a bid
package that permitted it to acquire DCA despite strong competition from the British foods group,
Dalgety.  However, Kerry purchased DCA before all important information was known. In
conceding this point, Brosnan told his bankers that it "would take all of 1995 to fully understand
DCA and where it will fit in with our existing businesses [24]."
R&D Expenditures
As the firm evolved heavily into the food ingredients business, the importance of expanding
R&D quickly became apparent.  Thus, Kerry Cooperative set up an in-house R&D program in the
early 1980s, opting not to rely on the R&D provided by a national government agency.
Brosnan's views on the importance of investments in technology and R&D are revealed in part
by a 1995 interview [5]:
The ingredients sector is somewhere between food engineering and pharmaceutical
application.  It requires companies to invest heavily in technology, as well as research and
development…Continuing with the development of new products in an industry where
technology and innovation are so important requires a significant expenditure on research
and development…2.5% to 3.0% of turnover will continue to be spent on R&D because of its
importance.
In another 1995 interview, Brosnan commented as follows about the importance of R&D [30]:
You must plan for the long-term.  Kerry would be millions of dollars more profitable if it
downsized R&D tomorrow morning.  We spend heavily in our venture group which is trying
to create the technology of the future.  Since we are a technology company, R&D is part of
our strategy. Shareholders have seen Kerry stock outperform the market, so they are very
happy.  Of course, we're also open to short-term ideas that can boost profits overnight.
Changes in Personnel Recruitment Practices
As Kerry Group/PLC has evolved into an international food ingredients and consumer food
products company, its personnel needs have changed.  The firm's emphasis on technology
development and R&D necessitated recruitment of larger numbers of employees with food science,
engineering, and technology backgrounds. The firm's acquisitions also necessitated having
substantial in-house capabilities in finance.
The firm's  global expansion has placed a premium on diversity and language capabilities.
Brosnan commented on this point as follows [30]:
We find differences in American and European  thinking, particularly relating to
language.  We now recruit people out of college who speak two languages plus their native
language. In the Kerry organization, managers are from different backgrounds, nationalities,
cultures and have different language skills.  It's very important when you to go a new
continent to have a mix.
Changes in Marketing Practices
Like those relating to personnel, the firm's marketing practices of necessity changed as it
moved away from being a dairy cooperative increasingly into food ingredients and consumer
foods.  Part of the difference relates to the need to work closely with final customers for food
ingredients and consumer foods.
Hugh Friel, Deputy Managing Director of Kerry Group/PLC, said that the changing nature of
the firm forced Kerry to stop exporting through the Irish Dairy Board (IDB) in about 1990 [6].
Kerry needed to be in position to work with final customers to explain the technical characteristics
of the products and applications of the products.  Kerry also wished to be positioned to offer priceThe Evolution of Ireland’s Kerry Group/PLC￿Implications for the U.S. and Global Dairy-Food Industries
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concessions when necessary to final customers.  It is difficult to explain technical characteristics or
make needed price concessions if sales are made through an intermediary such as the IDB.
VI. An Evaluation of Kerry Group/PLC's Corporate Strategies
As noted earlier, the Kerry Group/PLC's corporate strategy is to diversify and grow the
business emphasizing differentiated (value-added) food ingredients and consumer food products.
This core strategy is supported by a number of other strategies and practices, notably one that
emphasizes growth by acquisition.
Collis and Montgomery provide a "Triangle of Corporate Strategy" (Figure 3) that is useful for
evaluating the Kerry Group/PLC's corporate strategies.  Points relating to Kerry that are raised by
the Collis-Montgomery Triangle are addressed below in a Q &A (Question & Answer) format.







Role of Corporate Office
Systems Processes Structure
Resources Businesses
* Source:  Collis and Montgomery [4].
Q1:  Is there a clear and well-articulated vision for the firm?
A1:  Brosnan has stated that his business philosophy—which is probably a suitable proxy for a
vision for the firm—is "Technological creativity, superior product service, superior customer
service, and wholehearted commitment of each employee" [30]. This vision statement seems to be
a viable guiding vision for the different facets of the business.
Brosnan's other goals such as the 15% per year growth target are perhaps less useful as a
vision.  While the 15% growth target generally has been met in the past, such growth may not be
sustainable over the longer-run.  After a firm acquires a certain large size, such growth targets
prove difficult to meet consistently.
Q2:  Are the elements of the firm's corporate strategy internally consistent—i.e., are they
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A2:  This is difficult to assess meaningfully with available information.  Certainly the two main
divisions of the firm—food ingredients and consumer food products—are closely related.  It is
feasible for the firm to implement strategies and practices that allow the divisions to produce
economies of scope and complementarities.  However, it is unclear whether technologies used to
advantage in one division or location are quickly adopted where appropriate in others.  This is
doubtful given the short time between major acquisitions of food ingredient firms by Kerry.
However, it is clear that officers of the firm recognize the need for internally consistent strategies.
Q3:  Does the firm's strategy fit with the external environment?
A3:  The point of this question is that "firms should never forget to assess the underlying
attractiveness of the external environment (industries) in which they compete. No matter how
effective the corporate strategy, if the firm's businesses are tough to make money in, the financial
results of the strategy are likely to be poor" [4, pp. 174-175].
Kerry appears to have developed strategies that address this question exceedingly well.  The
firm recognized early that it was advantageous to de-emphasize businesses that were affected by
weather, diseases and EEC (now EU) milk quotas.  Kerry has also recognized that food
ingredients businesses carry substantially higher profit margins than either the consumer foods
business or the agribusiness functions.  Hence, the firm's acquisitions during the late 1980s and
1990s focused heavily on ingredient firms.  Finally, Kerry’s divestitures—e.g., Spiller
mills—have purged components of acquired firms that generated low margins or failed to
complement other aspects of the divisions.
 Q4:  Is the strategy too risky?  Specifically, is the organization being asked to do too much in
too short a time?
A4:  Brosnan and other senior managers of Kerry Group/PLC appear to be advocates of
"stretch" targets.  Collis and Montgomery point out that striking an appropriate balance between
setting challenging targets and overextending an organization is a difficult task [4, p. 175].
Kerry's  managers recognize that firm's employees need time to assimilate major new
acquisitions.  Moreover, Brosnan and other senior managers didn't make new acquisitions until
after existing segments of the firm had generated profits needed to pay down debt on previous
acquisitions to manageable levels.  However, Kerry's new acquisitions during the 1990's certainly
were not made at a leisurely pace.  Excessive attention was not paid to these constraints.
Q5:  Does the strategy produce value creation that is sustainable?
A5:  Kerry's value creation appears to be consistent with ideas advanced by Drucker, Prahalad
and Hamel, and other business strategists who claim that the essence of strategy lies in creating
tomorrow's competitive advantages faster than competitors mimic the ones you possess today.
Kerry creates competitive advantage partly by being an early mover in acquiring high profit margin
food ingredients businesses.  The firm probably can continue to find attractive food ingredients
firms to acquire for a few more years, but it is difficult to imagine that these acquisitions can
continue indefinitely.  This means that, at some point, the firm will need to squeeze more profits
out of existing businesses or begin to acquire another group of high profit businesses.  Value
creation in the latter areas may be more difficult to achieve than selecting desirable food ingredients
companies to acquire.
Q6:  Are there consistencies between the firm's (a) resources and businesses, (b) businesses
and corporate structures, systems and processes, and (c) resources and corporate structures,
systems and processes?  These points are potentially important for reasons of competitive
advantage, control and coherence.
A6:  Certain aspects of this question are addressed above and need no further discussion.
However, Q6 does raise questions about the fit between the acquired firms and Kerry and the long-
term profitability of the acquisitions.The Evolution of Ireland’s Kerry Group/PLC￿Implications for the U.S. and Global Dairy-Food Industries
18 Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2000-2
Collis and Montgomery point out that the benefits and drawbacks associated with acquisitions
include those noted below [4, p. 90]:
Benefits Drawbacks
Speed Cost of acquisition
Access to complementary assets Unnecessary adjunct businesses
Removal of potential competitor Organizational clashes may impede integration
Upgrade corporate resources Major commitment
Several of these points have been mentioned in previous sections.  Speed of growth was a
factor in several of the acquisitions.  The Dalgety acquisition resulted in "acquiring an acquirer"
which had snapped up food ingredients businesses in Europe prior to the acquisition by Kerry.
Thus the Dalgety acquisition eliminated a competitor for high profit margin ingredients business in
Europe.  Kerry's acquisitions in North America gave the firm access to valuable corporate
resources in the form of customer bases on the North American continent.
Among the drawbacks, the cost of acquisition is perhaps most important and worthy of special
comment. As noted previously, analysts questioned whether Kerry had paid too much for both
Beatreme and DCA. Such questions are raised for the following reasons noted by Collis and
Montgomery [4, p. 91]:
When making an acquisition, managers often lose sight of the fact that acquisitions are
purchased in a market—the market for corporate control—that functions reasonably well.
Importantly, the going price for a firm reflects not only the value of the firm as a stand alone
concern, but also incorporates the incremental value the market feels the assets would have to
a host of potential acquirers.  Unless the winning bidder can use the assets in an unusual way,
and create value that other bidders could not, it should not expect to earn economic rents on
assets it purchases in the market…value created in most mergers is captured by the
shareholders of the acquired firms.
Kerry recognizes these points.  Moreover, it is possible that Kerry can use the acquired
resources in unusual ways.  Certainly complementarities between the Kerry's dairy ingredients
businesses and the cereal-based and fruit-based ingredients businesses acquired in the 1990s might
make  some of those later acquisitions more valuable to Kerry than to competing bidders.
Moreover, Kerry did thoroughly analyze the potential profitability of the acquisitions before
making them under its "knowledge is the forerunner to strategy" operating procedure. It also must
be conceded that Kerry's acquisitions in the ingredients business appear to be profitable or at least
not a problem for the firm.
Nonetheless, the "cost of acquisition" drawback will face Kerry in the future.  This is not a
trivial point.  Some of Kerry's future acquisitions could fit the description of the typical
acquisition, which earns no economic rent for the purchaser.
VII.Implications of the Strategies of the Kerry Group/PLC for U.S. and Other
Dairy-Food Exporters and Investors
Certain ideas flow from Kerry's strategies and practices that have implications for U.S. and
other dairy-food exporters and investors:
1)      Ability            to           relate           a           company            to            its           environment            is           important      .  Faced with difficult conditions
in the 1970s and mid-1980s, the firm exhibited a noteworthy ability to recognize
opportunities for diversification into value-added products.  The firm recognized early that
its basic options were to "diversify or merge."  If the firm had chosen to merge rather than
diversify, it probably would now be a small part of one of Ireland's larger dairy companies
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2)      Continuity            of           top             management           is           important      .   Denis Brosnan, Managing Director of the
Kerry Group/PLC, has served as top manager of the firm or its predecessors since 1972.
Moreover, two of the firm's Deputy Managing Directors have been with firm since 1972
and a number of Kerry's other top managers have been with the firm since the mid-1970s.
This has permitted the firm to pursue consistent strategies over an extended time period.  
The continuity and trust generated by Brosnan, in particular, has permitted the firm to
change from a position where Kerry Cooperative, Inc. held 51% control to a position
where the Cooperative held about 37% of the Group's stock.  This change in control
permitted greater use of equity capital for expansion purposes and helped the firm gain
other important advantages.
3)        Knowledge             is            a              key            f           orerunner             to            strategy       .    The  Kerry Group has made important
acquisitions and other strategic moves only after careful (and sometimes lengthy) analysis.
The analysis appears to have converted certain of Kerry's acquisitions from the excessively
risky category to the manageable risk category.
4)      Early             mover          advantages          are           important      .   The firm has  evolved into one of the world's
largest food ingredients firms, partly because of early recognition of the importance of
acquiring Beatreme and DCA.  While corporate "stretch" was involved in these
acquisitions,  the company probably would now be the poorer if it had not made the
acquisitions.  The two acquired firms exhibit complementarities and strong profit
generating capacity.
5)      Latin           America          and           Asia          are            growth             m            arkets          for            dairy          and            other          food            products     .   Kerry's
decision to expand its food ingredients business into Latin America and Asia recognizes
that these markets are growth markets. The firm's ability to serve fast food companies that
are expanding rapidly in these markets should contribute to profits.
6)      A         firm's           infrastructure              must          change          substantially             when           it          evolves          as            dramatically          as             Kerry
Group/PLC      .  The firm changed its financing, R&D, personnel recruitment, and marketing
practices to reflect what it has become.  Kerry's capital investment decisions were also
made to support the changing nature of the firm as it evolved from a commodity-oriented
dairy cooperative into a global food ingredients and consumer foods company.
7)        Kerry's         conversion           to          a          coopera          tive/PLC             was          a            necessary            but            not          sufficient          condition          for
success     .  In the business environment of the mid-1980s, Kerry Cooperative's decision to
convert to a cooperative/PLC was a sound strategic move.  This move helped Kerry to
make certain early acquisitions.  But many of the firm's acquisitions in the late 1980s and
1990s were made mostly with debt rather than stock equity.  The continuity of top
management, the Managing Director's vision, the firm's bold acquisition practices, and the
firm's knowledge of customers, competitors, and markets go further in explaining Kerry's
success than its PLC structure.
8)      Acquisitions             possess           inherent            drawbacks     .  Kerry appears to have made mostly successful
acquisitions to build the firm into a world leader in food ingredients.  However, unless
Kerry can continue to use acquired assets in an unusually productive way, and create value
that other bidders cannot, it should not expect to earn economic rents on assets it purchases
in the market. This fact of life will affect Kerry's future acquisitions.
9)      The             Kerry             Group/PLC             model             will            not            be          easily          replicated       .  Kerry's experience should be
of interest to U.S. firms that are contemplating expansion into international dairy-food
markets, and to organizations, such as the New Zealand Dairy Board, that are considering
fundamental changes in global marketing practices.  However, it is apparent that unique
conditions in the business environment in the 1970s in Ireland, a complex bundle of
mutually-reinforcing strategies, and early mover advantages (which will make it expensive
for others to gain large positions in international ingredients markets in particular) have
contributed to the Kerry Group PLC's successes.  Opportunities to assemble this
combination of developments and strategies will not occur frequently.The Evolution of Ireland’s Kerry Group/PLC￿Implications for the U.S. and Global Dairy-Food Industries
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Appendix.  Kerry Group/PLC's Capital Investments, 1995-98*
Year and Country of
Capital Investment
Nature of Capital Investment
1995
UK A new central warehouse and distribution facility was completed at
Hyde.
1996
US An investment program for a technical center in Beloit, Wisconsin
was started.  Investment was made in Evansville, Indiana food
coatings plant.
France A fruit research center was established at Apt as part of the Ciprial
operations.
UK Investments were made in the fruit processing sector and in the Hyde
and Durham meat and ready meals processing plants.
Ireland The Limerick meat processing facility was upgraded.
1997
UK The direct sales division was relocated to new headquarters in
Andover, 50 new vans were secured, and two new distribution
centers were opened in Carlisle and Newbury.  A facility was being
developed at Burton on Trent site to handle premium chilled ready
meals.
Ireland Limerick site extended for increased production of value-added
chicken products. Forty vehicles were delivered to aid in-house
distribution.
US Culinary unit developed at R&D Center in Beloit, Wisconsin.
Asia Pacific Region Technical center/administrative headquarters built to serve region.
1998
UK Completed investment program at Attleborough site to provide
extended facilities for ready-to-cook meats.
Canada Major investment program at Glen Arrow Products following
acquisition.
Poland Investment in fruit preparation facilities.
* Source:  Sevmour-Cooke Ltd., “Europe’s Tops Food Groups, Kerry Group, Tralee, Co. Kerry, Ireland,” 1998.